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Abstract: New directions in management accounting studies should
aim at getting us out of the ontological trap which is provided by the
decision making conception of management. The Scandinavian
tradition of fieldwork in the area might offer a basis for ontological
renewal, which may open up for methodological innovation when we
embark on epistemological adventures. The main thrust in this paper
is to explore the idea of ”modest intervention” in action research with
the objective of ontological discovery.
“Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into
one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole” John Dewey (McDermott
(ed.) 1981)
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Action Research in Management Accounting Studies
Outline of argument.
The claim in this paper is that a renewal of management accounting
research is possible and desirable if we focus, for a while, on ontological
issues and the research required if we shift our ontological basis from
decision making towards organisational learning and management.
The argument is first to show how ontology determines which
questions are posed and what specifically how our research focus shifts
when an organisational learning perspective is applied. Dissatisfaction
with the theoretical basis can be expressed by theoretical argument
(offering alternative explanations to phenomena, like, e.g.,
institutional theorists do) or by claiming that empirical observations do
not ”fit” (like fieldwork in the Scandinavian tradition has given rise
to). The empirical route is chosen and an argument for action research
with modest intervention is presented.
The ontological trap
Management accounting research is in need of a debate on methods.
This need is caused by the rapid changes in the way companies are
managed. The traditional manufacturing firm is no longer typical,
alliances and other constellations make the issue of what is the unit of
analysis fuzzy. Financial accounting approaches seem to gain
adherence, and extremely expensive new systems are sold to top
management on arguments like integration and quicker payment of
bills (to consultants?). Investments that have little chance of earning a
decent return. Macintosh (1994) has investigated different alternative
views. I have myself argued for approaches which build on trust and
co-operation (Jönsson 1996, 1998, Birnberg 1998), and Jönsson &
Macintosh (1997) have argued for a dialogue. Gietzmann and Larsen
(1998) argue that there are motivational costs involved in emulating
the Japanese style of co-operating with subcontractors, just to mention
one example of the ontological slippery slope management accounting
research finds itself.
My own argument (1998) was intended to align management
accounting research with managerial work, and there is overwhelming
evidence from empirical studies of managerial work that such work
does not include much decision making (Carlson 1951, Mintzberg 1973,
Kotter 1982, Luthans et al. 1988). If decision-making is not what
managers mostly do – instead they spend most of their activities to
inform themselves in order to be able to make good use of judgement,
management accounting research may have been barking up the
wrong tree. A debate on issues like these is an ontological one; What is
it we are studying? and What should we be studying?
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First consider the notion that managers’ work is to make decisions.
Managerial work should add value to the company. Choosing between
predetermined alternatives a la textbook cases does not add value
(unless some alternative manager would have chosen a worse
alternative, but how could he if he is assumed to be a rational decision-
maker?). So the value must come from the working out of the
alternatives. From conducting the projects which generate the new
alternatives or from the governance structure which steers
implementation efforts. Or maybe the implementation itself is the
value adding work? Anyhow it is clear that the choice between
alternatives which are completely specified cannot be considered value
adding under the assumptions of rationality. So the choice made by
management between the presented alternatives must be seen as a (re-)
confirmation of the hierarchical power invested in management to
initiate action through decision. Nothing is added through the decision
except action intent.
The next step is implementation of the plan implied by the matrix of
co-ordinated activities that the decision contains. All the activities for
the next period must be decided at the same time, otherwise we might
be making non-optimal decisions. But they may not be started at the
same time - better do sub assemblies of components before final
assembly - and by the time any of the products in the portfolio reaches
the market (wherever that is located) other actors (competitors,
customers, legislators) may have changed their ways. It might happen
that the market (if we can find it) is in disequilibrium. Our problem
becomes a forecasting problem with the environment changing its
behaviour on the basis of our changes. We are in a game where the
rules of the game change when the participants learn how other actors
apply those rules. The only way out of this dynamism is to assume that
the other actors will behave in a certain way, measure outcomes, and
adjust decisions in accordance with a ”black box” analysis of what
might have caused the deviation from our assumptions - in an eternal
hunt for ”the right decision”.
We might, of course, add the assumption that our assumptions about
the behaviour of the other actors were the correct ones - after all they
were based on the best available evidence! - and demand better
competence and discipline from organisational members. Then we can
assert our will and gain market power. But if we made a mistake in our
judgement of the capability of our own organisation to carry out our
intentions, is it not likely that we have also made errors of judgement
about the other actors, whose organisation we do not know as well?
The decision-making paradigm leaves us with a functional model of
management accounting, which provides data to a decision model,
which, in turn, produces ”the right decision”. Since the decision model
is always correct (deduction) the data will control the decision. The
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right data leads to the right decision. Wrong data (measurement error
or lack of relevance) will generate the wrong decision.
Figure 1. Management accounting and decision making.
      From MAS              Decision-making Output
Max f = S  a(i)x(i)         “”The
Subject to
x(i)< C(i)
The problem with this approach is that the decision making
mechanism cannot learn (it has to be replaced with another model if
we are not satisfied). This is the ontological trap. It might be possible to
find solutions in a stable environment where law-like behaviour could
be expected and the tools of scientific inquiry could be applied (c.f.
Popper 1968, 1979). In a dynamic environment where markets are not
in equilibrium learning is the only option. This is a belief statement - a
conjecture as it were.
The Action Approach.
If we want to include learning in our model, we have to include action
since it is action, which causes change in the world, and we can reflect
upon concrete experiences of the world. An excellent way of learning is
to make an experiment and see what happens. We can test our
hypotheses against outcomes if we carry out the action of the
experiment (the decision to do an experiment is not enough). Kolb
(1984) provides a theory of learning from experience which is
intuitively appealing. The gist of his argument, it seems, is that
learning is a cycle of concrete experience, reflection, conceptualisation,
and active experimentation.
DATA “TheRight
Decision”
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Figure 2. Kolb’s (1984, p. 42) experiential learning.
Concrete
Experience
             Apprehension
Active
Experimentation     Extension
                   Intention          Reflective
             observation
            Comprehension
Abstract
Conceptualisation
Kolb is firmly positioned in American pragmatism (James, Pierce,
Dewey, Mead, for a critique see Diggins 1994) which could be
characterised for our purposes as claiming ‘if it works in your
experience; if, after having been frustrated you are ready to act on the
basis of this information, then it is true in a pragmatic sense’. There are
two axles in the Kolb cycle; the apprehension-comprehension axle
where comprehension represents conceptual interpretation and
symbolic representation (the decision model is one). Apprehension is
perceiving and recognising in a direct mode. Apprehension is a
primitive form of learning, which includes imitation. The other axle is
intention-extension. The intended object is the phenomenon we focus
our attention on. What is that bulky thing moving behind the bushes?
Is it a moose? My hunting partner will help me in my reflections.
When I ask him: ”Do you see the moose over there?” he will say ”For
God’s sake don’t shoot! It is Peterson!” and a mistaken classification can
be avoided. Reflecting on this experience I might conceptualise
something about my regular check-up at the optician’s, or about the
principle of shooting only when the whole of the moose is in clear
sight. Next I can apply my new conception in active experimentation (I
can make the social experiment of telling the gathering hunting team
that I have learnt that a good way of avoiding shooting Peterson is to
count the legs and see what happens. I can also keep quiet about the
incident (hoping that the partner will be loyal) and test whether
counting the number of legs before shooting applies to other situations
as well.
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It is a basic assumption upon which the argument in this paper is based
that effective learning (meaning change in “Ways of working”)
requires whole cycles. This claim thus maintains that learning by
imitation or by conversion in an act of faith (trusting your consultant)
are not proper examples of learning since the change in ways of
working which might follow is the result of experience with the first
application (when the whole cycle is completed).
Action
Humans are well equipped to attribute meaning to acts; in fact it is the
meaning that turns events into acts, because acts are caused by actors.
There is an intent, and, consequently, responsibility. If the actor can
give a reason (account) for the act and if the actor is following a rule
(and thus will behave consistently in the future), then the act is
meaningful or has a sense (Winch 1958, Wittgenstein 1953). The
criteria thus are that the actor is seen as knowing what she or he is
doing, and that the behaviour is principled. The account we give for
our action must not necessarily be accurate but it should be
recognisable as a reason. If our behaviour is embarrassing we may be
excused if we say “Sorry, I was just playing around without paying
attention”. The second criterion would then be to show commitment
to a better rule (be more attentive) for the future.
The most basic use of action is to determine who we are. The world
around us will only tell us who we are as reaction to action. It provides
a mirror where we can see ourselves (Arendt 1978). As humans we are
torn between two urges; to establish our identity through action, and
avoid disappointment. Trouble is that in seeking one we risk the other.
Arendt (1978) points to two extreme strategies:
1) Try to dominate the environment in order to control reactions
2) Avoid action (join the crowd).
(Argyris (1982; Argyris et al 1985) may have identified a third strategy in
pointing out undiscussability as a strategy. The claim of Argyris is in
summary that “people cover up and they cover up that they cover up
which makes some things undiscussable”. This amounts to not
participating in communication on managerial issues, at least not
truthfully, and at least not in a co-operative mode. Rather it invites to a
game inside an agency theory setting with moral hazard.)
Both strategies mentioned by Arendt are doomed, if we try to control
the reaction of the environment we will get a distorted view of
ourselves, and if we do not act we give up our identity. What is left is
to choose Courage!, prepare to endure the slings and arrows  and risk
losing face.
This kind of reasoning is central to the establishment of a conception of
action since our attribution of meaning to the acts of others also
GRI-report 1999:2
8
Gothenburg Research Institute
includes evaluation of the person’s competence and trustworthiness. If
we are true to our identity or role the others can more easily behave
rationally in relation to our expected behaviour, and communication is
simplified (c.f. Jönsson 1998). (It is left to the reader to consider in what
way the suggested strategies can be applied in research and specifically
action research.)
Having thus established that identity formation (including team
formation) is always present in action, at least as a by-product, we can
state that action has intention and manifests itself in a change in the
world, as we perceive it. Action is cause by an actor who is made visible
through action. We make sense of action by attributing various
relations to it, not least expected outcomes.
Action Research
When scientists  “engage with participants in a collaborative process of
critical inquiry into problems of social practice in a learning context”.
(Argyris et al 1985, p. 237) is the description of action research pursued
here. Engagement, collaboration, critical inquiry, practice, and learning
context provide a complex of criteria that may only be approximated in
the individual project. A similar view is expressed in the Finnish
“development inquiry approach” (Tamminen 1993, Pellinen 1997),
where a stated requirement is to develop a solution to a practical
problem which is implemented and then confirmed working by the
partner from practice. Given such a strong success criterion it is
obvious that ontological discovery must be a primary task. It is not
enough to impose one’s favourite theory and then blame inadequate
adaptation to the requirements of the theory as cause of a failure. This
is what was used to explain why Program Budgeting failed all over the
world in spite of its rationalist structure. Wildavsky’s (1975) conclusion
when evaluating the experience of that top-down reform can be
summarised: We have only one world and Program Budgeting has
been applied in it. It did not work!
The orientation implied by the definition above is toward practice as
the measuring rod. This means that the epistemological requirement is
given (Does it work in practice?) while ontology has to be discovered.
Usually research goes the other way, i.e., ontology is given (decision-
makers are rational) and epistemological discovery is sought.
Action research, then, attempts to initiate learning cycles of Kolb’s
kind, where learning takes place as stated by Argyris et al. (1985, p. 52):
“Act and reflect upon your action”. The problem is to initiate “natural”
learning processes. Natural should not be taken literally here because a
first requirement is that there is recognition of a problem. In this sense
the context of study is not natural, things are not as they were supposed
to be. But the recognition of a problem, outcomes do not match
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expectations, may be based in unrealistic expectations as well as
unsatisfactory outcomes. In both cases an open-minded study of causes
is in order. Experiments in a stricter sense are not possible and the
substitute is to reflect on concrete experience. Such reflection,
remember Weick’s (1995) advice “Talk your walk” (p. 182), is better
conducted in dialogue. Firstly because it provides a convenient way of
eliminating error (Do you see what I see?), and secondly because the
group is a good environment for learning in judgement tasks.
Moscovici and Doise (1994) have shown that groups when allowed
time and freedom to arrive at a common judgement on a complex task
tend toward extreme positions. This is called “group polarisation.” If a
group of people with prior opinions were supposed to arrive at a
common judgement one would assume that some kind of
compromise would be tried. Instead they tend to converge toward the
extreme opinions in the group. Furthermore, if a format has been used,
participants tend to stick to the new opinion in post-experiment
debriefing. If, on the other hand, there are restrictions, like time limits
or a set structure, the group will tend towards compromise and
participants will return to their original opinions after the experiment
(no learning). If these results are valid then it is advisable to try to
emulate a free format for the collective decision on what is the
problem. This calls for a “modest intervention”1, i.e., when the
researcher assumes a role which does not lead to restrictions on the
group polarisation process which may inhibit learning. Should the
researcher assume a “teaching” role, and thus impose a specific world
view on the client, then the research should be described as
consultancy and the results viewed as proof of the researcher’s teaching
ability. This could boost the self-confidence of the researcher, but not
our knowledge of organisational learning.
This conception of action research also specifies the problem to be
developed in the remainder of this paper: What can be considered
“modest intervention”?
Modest intervention.
The purpose of a modest intervention is to help initiate a learning
process (Kolb 1984) given that there is a preliminary conception of an
organisational problem. The recognition of a problem is a necessary
pre-condition for the interaction between researcher and organisational
member to emerge at all. An organisational member on one level
might start communication with the researcher on the premise that
there is a problem on another organisational level, but it is still
necessary for the researcher to agree with members of the focus
organisational unit that there is a problem (even if it is still
unspecified).
                                                
1
 This term was offered by Peter Checkland as discussant of an earlier paper of mine (Jönsson 1990)
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The starting point of an intervention can probably be any part of the
Kolb cycle (Concrete experience, Reflective observation, Abstract
conceptualisation, Active experimentation) and the joint task is to
provide for a completion of the whole cycle which may require
negotiation with surrounding organisational units. The modesty of the
intervention lies in the  fact that the cycle is under the control of
organisational members. This does not preclude the researcher from
making suggestions or presenting counter arguments. The ideal
relation between researcher and organisational member is the one
depicted by Habermas (1984). The parties should aim at reaching an
understanding through the acceptance of better arguments. If the
starting point is a concrete experience the two parties might engage in a
sense making exercise (Do you see what I see?). Have observations been
made the first thing might be to conceptualise this into a model. Is the
model already there the discussion could be on how an experiment to
test its validity could be designed (an approach recommended by
Argyris (1982) to make undiscussable things discussable.)
Modest intervention, in order to be successful, probably requires a start
in simple problems that have a fair chance of getting solved in a short
time. Once successful cycles have been completed the team will be
motivated to take on more challenging problems. Furthermore success
will be recognised by the environment and the goodwill thus generated
will improve the odds for success in later learning cycles.
Data collection
No stricter requirements in data collections apply to action research
than to other approaches. If a survey is included it should be done
according to the book. Interviews should be made professionally etc.
What is specific to action research is the need to document the research
process. This should be done through a diary with appended
documents. It is what researchers do in other disciplines and it must be
done in action research. A researcher in Molecular Biology will keep
notes of the progress of her experiments in a bound note book with
data counts on cell status (or whatever data are significant) appended so
that the research process can be retraced (cf. the Baltimore case, Hull
1998). The same goes for action research. Even if this material is not
reported in the papers that come out of the project the researcher must
have this back-up information.
Reporting action research
The distinguishing features about action research are that it
1) Deals with a process and that time is a significant variable, and
2) That the causalities of the process are uncertain as a consequence of
the ontological discovery purpose.
From this follows that the normal mode of reporting will be in
narrative form. The only way of making the findings meaningful is by
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telling a story in context, again because the purpose normally is
ontological discovery. The alternative is to refer to a specific theory for
definitions of variables and relations between variables, but this is
often not a useful approach because the theory is built on given
ontological assumptions and the discoveries of deviations from those
assumptions are not permissible. The classical defence of economic
theories against empirical observations have been and will continue to
be the “ceteris paribus” clause. This means that the narrative appeal,
the flow and dynamics of the story, will play a role for the success of the
report. Following Bruner (1990), an early champion of the human
information processing approach but now one of its sharpest critics, we
can claim that there are two types of cognitive systems that give
meaning to our experience; the paradigmatic, where the organising
principle is conceptual, and the narrative where the organising
principle is narrative. In the latter case it is the components of the story
itself constitute the meaning, and the reader sees the point. In the
former case the frame of reference in terms of the constellation of
concepts give meaning to observations. In both cases the observer
“works out” a meaning, even if the approach is different.
The typical action research results, reported in narrative form, are
preparadigmatic by definition, either because the research area has not
developed a paradigm (Kuhn 1964) yet, and this would be the case in
management accounting studies, or because the results is challenging
existing ontological beliefs. In both cases further studies testing
hypotheses derived from the new findings are necessary before
generalisations are appropriate.  What may be claimed, however, is
that a concept which is given meaning by the narrative may be
applicable to other cases, and even generally applicable. In this sense a
good action research report is perfectly compatible with the Popper
(1968) view of conjectures and refutations as the structuring feature of
scientific progress. One should not mix the two elements up.
Modest intervention in practice
In this section a number of narratives illustrating modest
interventions that succeeded will be presented.
After studying, for 3 years, how teams in automated component
production took command over their work Grönlund (Jönsson and
Grönlund 1988) found that interest in financial information was
temporary. Only when they had a problem did team members feel a
need to look into and interpret such information. What happened was
that a group member (usually the foreman) would alert the team to a
problem? There would be a meeting in the machine group where it
was agreed that this was the problem and in order to find a solution
this information was needed. Then there would be a fact-finding
period when data were collected and fed into the team’s PC. When data
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were collected they would be summarised (when applicable) in graphic
form and a meeting would be called to discuss what action is
appropriate. That meeting would allocate responsibility for action on
the issue between team members and initiate action. After some time a
cost report for the machine group would show that the desired
improvement had occurred. Then the matter was closed and the new
procedure confirmed.
In this case the learning cycle was initiated by the declaration: “We
have a problem!” It was usually the leader of the group who directed
the attention to a phenomenon, but sometimes a machine operator
would point out that, e.g., this specific brand of cutting tool causes
quality problems in the lathe operation. The operator would sound the
alarm on the basis of concrete experiences; the foreman would locate
problems from operating statistics and cost reports, by comparing to
established norms.  Most of the time no alarms were sounded and
operations were run normally. Learning occurred in spurts of increased
attention and would normally result in some change of a routine.
But there was also cascading problem discoveries. In the drive shaft
line the initiating event was the statement “We are too high on cutting
tools!” The first meeting focused on whether the standard was
reasonable, and a counting exercise was started. How many drive shafts
are processed before a tool has to be exchanged for quality reasons? This
focus on tools led to the insight that the individual cutting tool costs
money. Half empty boxes of cutting tools were found in all kinds of
unlikely places and as a by-effect cost awareness improved, when
members saw the benefits of using all cutting tools in the box.
Furthermore a routine for checking cutting tools was established. Later
on, when a representative of one of the cutting tool suppliers
announced the arrival of the new wonder tool, the operators could run
it in comparison with the other brands and decide that it kept what it
promised. Even if it cost twice as much more than double the number
of shafts could be processed before it went dull. The operators took the
decision to shift to a better cutting tool (and the team had to see to it
that the purchasing department got it right).
There were other learning cycles as well. When one of the teams had
been recognised as a competent problem solving team they,
increasingly, used relations with neighbouring departments in their
pursuit of improvement. One example was the discovery that sloppy
sand blasting, by the foundry, of the blanks for the brake drum line
caused higher cutting tool costs. If the team could keep the foundry
alert to the need to do proper sand blasting they could keep their own
costs down and quality up. This latter approach, improving the context
in which operations were run and as a consequence efficiency, by
influencing the environment, constituted an expansion of the sphere
of influence of the learning team. A further expansion appeared when
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the foreman of the focus team was asked by the division head to design
a one-day course in teambased cost management. By then the team was
managing itself and the foreman could do the course design at home. If
there were any trouble the team would call. This course was then given
at least 25 times in different production plants around the company (by
the foreman).
The modest intervention in this case was for the researchers to
convince the division head that team based learning is an interesting
approach, and the union that the benefits of improvement effects
would be negotiated, and the team that this would be something that
they could control. The team was provided with a PC with some
standard software and the team got some training in how to use the
computer and they were asked to go ahead with improvement work as
they saw fit.
Another modest intervention (Jönsson and Solli 1993) was to have a
two day training conference where 6 managers of the Social Services
department were taught the basics of financial concepts, the structure of
the municipal budget, and how one could design one’s own financial
reports. The conference ended with the participants designing their
own reports to provide the information they needed with the layout
they preferred. The researchers’ purpose with the study was to see how
the use of accounting information would be effected by the
individually adapted design of reports. In order to collect data on the
use of accounting information the 6 managers were visited upon the
arrival of the monthly reports and a conversation on the economic
situation was held where the starting question was “How are you
doing?” (Financially). The challenge, it was thought, would be that
these unit managers were the kind of professionals which are most
unlikely to have much understanding for applying financial concepts
to their work. It turned out that the respondents were concerned with
definitions of their area of responsibility initially (Is this kind of cost
really my responsibility?). About halfway through the year focus
tended towards obstacles to rational management. (The municipality
was this central purchasing contract which forces me to buy low quality
at a high price, when I could get what I needed cheaper if I only....!).
The researcher could take the message to the top of the hierarchy and a
decision to exempt units from the central contract demonstrated
support for rational management. Towards the end of the research
period the managers tended to talk about possible projects to improve
operations. “What-if” –reasoning with the researcher as a friendly
listener allowed the respondent to articulate half-baked ideas and get
some feed back.  All 6 units had better efficiency development than
comparable units. Maybe the most interesting aspect of this action
research study was that the participants valued the talks higher than
conceptual training and individualised cost reports. This author started
to play with the thought that economic judgement is a kind of
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reasoning (constructing projects), preferably in conversation with
others, rather than taking the shortest route to a decision (cf. the Dewey
quotation on p. 1).
In a series of action research studies (Jönsson 1996, chapt. 9) conducted
during recent years we have used video sequences as, possibly not so
modest, interventions to stimulate reflection in teams. Regular
meetings of project teams or management groups have been
videofilmed. From the original tape sequences of one or two minutes
were edited onto a second tape, which was then used as input stimulus
in interviews. For each sequence shown individually to each
participant in the team the question was asked, “What is going on
here?” and the response was audiotaped and transcribed. For each
sequence there would thus be 15 understandings in a team of 15. From
the beginning the research team was amazed by the frequency of
misunderstandings in serious management meetings. It has been
possible to study in detail how misunderstanding or personal conflict
emerge in multi-person meetings.  The strength of the videofilm as
stimulus to reflection lies in its ability to focus attention. Numerous
respondents have said that they see more in the video feedback then
they do in the meeting itself. This seems to initiate a need to give
complete backgrounds to the event on the screen, which in turn gives
multi-facetted contexts to the event.
Methodological criticism has been given which claims that participants
will not behave normally in front of a video camera. We have found
this not to be the case for the following reasons (beside our own
observations): Participants are in a real management situation working
with competent colleagues. It is not possible to behave outside the
ordinary role because there is a camera and maintain the respect of
colleagues. Also the participants act in front of scrutinising audiences
all the time and the purpose is then as well as in the study to get
confirmation that a certain activity should be undertaken, an activity
which will influence real outcomes for the organisation. Individual
participants as well as teams have expressed satisfaction with the
improvement in work climate which have come from reflecting on
concrete communication situations without an outsider (the
researcher) pretending to know better.
These are some examples of what could be meant by applying modest
intervention. They seem to add up to the point that modest
intervention means not to impose some theoretical construction on
the organisation, but instead to use theory to explain the phenomena,
(which is the most worthy cause of scientific inquiry).
Summary and conclusion
This paper argues that action research is a useful approach when the
purpose is ontological discovery and explanation of management
Action Research in Management Accounting Studies
15
Gothenburg Research Institute
control phenomena. The starting point, in the ontological perspective,
is that action research deals with action (not the making of the right
decision) because it is action that changes the world. The actor in focus
learns from experience. Hence Kolb’s model of experiential learning.
A research problem then is how to initiate learning processes that can
be observed. It is suggested that modest intervention is a preferred way
to get “natural” processes started. (We do not want to study the
impetus of the researcher as consultant on organisational change.)
Modest intervention seeks to focus attention on a problem of the
actor’s choice and help get first action started. This can be achieved by
providing some new tools, like a computer at the disposal of the team,
or a conversation partner.
As far as the scientific status of action research is concerned the same
criteria for data collection apply as in other kinds of research. No action
researcher would claim general applicability of conclusions. Therefore
it is beside the point to criticise action research because it does not
produce general or universal truths. It does not and it does not pretend
to. What it attempts is ontological discovery and explanation of
observed phenomena. In order to secure reliability and traceability of
the findings it is suggested that there should be a firm requirement of
action research that the researcher keeps a detailed research diary so
that the project events can be traced. This same requirement is
operational in laboratory research in the biological sciences. The diary
should be bound and kept chronologically (same as invoices are
recorded in the book of first entry journal in accounting.
Modest interventions can be introduced at different points of the Kolb
cycle (concrete experience – active experimentation), but an important
aspect of action research with an organisational learning perspective is
that a complete cycle should be observed. Usually this will give a
documentation that is rich on dimensions and allows the application
of multiple theoretical perspectives in analysis. Therefore the action
research report should be expected to contain a narrative giving an
overview of the process that was studied, and a justified choice of
theoretical perspective to be applied in the analysis.
Since ontological discovery and careful observation are the core
characteristics action research will tend to a critical view, critical
towards established theory and conventional wisdom. If successful
companies do things that are at odds with what textbooks proclaim to
be the right thing to do, then action research will tend to claim that the
textbook author has a problem. It is easy to agree that action research is
best enjoyed in moderate doses, because it needs to be complemented
with tests of wider applicability of its discoveries.
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